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Abstract.  The digitization of manufacturing through the introduction of 
Industrie 4.0 technologies creates additional business opportunities and tech-
nical challenges. The integration of such technologies on legacy production ma-
chinery can upgrade them to become part of the digital and smart manufactur-
ing environment. A typical example is that of industrial monitoring and mainte-
nance, which can benefit from internet of things (IoT) solutions. This paper pre-
sents the development of an-IoT-enabled monitoring solution for machine tools 
as part of a remote maintenance approach. While the technical challenges per-
taining to the development and integration of such solutions in a manufacturing 
environment have been the subject of relevant research in the literature, the cor-
responding new security challenges arising from the introduction of such tech-
nologies have not received equal attention. Failure to adequately handle such is-
sues is a key barrier to the adoption of such solutions by industry. This paper 
aims to assess and classify the security aspects of integrating IoT technology 
with monitoring systems in manufacturing environments and propose a system-
atic view of relevant vulnerabilities and threats by taking an IoT architecture 
point of view. Our analysis has led to proposing a novel modular approach for 
secure IoT-enabled monitoring for legacy production machinery. The intro-
duced approach is implemented on a case study of machine tool monitoring, 
highlighting key findings and issues for further research.  
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1. Introduction 
Machine tools are among the key production equipment in  manufacturing envi-
ronments. Monitoring machinery health status enables preventive, predictive and 
proactive actions to be taken, leading to reducing downtime and breakdowns. When 
integrated with the overall production management considerations, including costs 
and planning considerations, this in turn can lead to improved production perfo r-
mance through higher overall equipment efficiency (OEE), while offering additional 
support towards meeting production and costs/profits targets are met. In this context, 
the introduction of internet of things (IoT) technologies constitute a prime enabler for 
the integration of legacy production machinery  to the dig ital factory era, enabling 
ubiquitous availability of machinery status and performance informat ion through 
different networking technologies.  
IoT technology, among other, enables a growing number of sensors , devices, assets 
and other human and non-human actors to communicate over wired and wireless net-
works, creating opportunities for new applications and services to be offered over the 
cloud. A typical manufacturing environment with legacy machine tools often lacks 
built-in sensors, external communicat ion capabilities  and applications or services for 
for real-time monitoring. Computer numeric control (CNC) machines are also often 
present, which do have communication capabilit ies (Ethernet) and an  Application 
Programming Interface (API) for exchanging data through third-party applications 
[1]. The lack o f provisions to easily monitor machine capabilities within the entire 
factory gives rise to a higher cost of integration through additional hardware and 
software in order to capture data autonomously and achieve some level of information 
integration in production environments . The use of IoT technologies can empower 
legacy machine tools  to become smart and connected. In this setting, machines, sen-
sors, devices, computing entit ies, human operators and the cloud become contributing 
constituents to a digital and s mart manufacturing environment. 
However, the introduction of such technologies also brings in additional challenges 
and in particu lar raises security concerns. Such concerns are yet to be sufficiently 
addressed in industry practice, especially concerning efforts to upgrade legacy equip-
ment  to the Industrie 4.0 era.  Contributing in the d irection  of addressing such chal-
lenges, this paper analyses security risks associated with introducing IoT devices in 
production environments . We propose a monitoring architecture through a novel 
modular IoT unit for legacy machine tools , equipped with the introduction of a novel 
multi-stage and adaptive authentication protocol at the hardware level. The security 
advantages arising from its use, compared to standard practices, are outlined. The 
paper is organized  as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of relevant literature. Sec-
tion 3 presents the approach used for the design and development of the modular IoT 
unit, paying attention to security issues. Section 4 describes a number of case studies 
with a DMG Mori Seiki machine tool, and the p ilot architecture to address security 
weaknesses. Section 5 states our conclusions and provides pointers to future work.  
2. IoT Security challenges in manufacturing environments  
Networks of s mart objects are employed in safety and security applications and are 
projected to scale up to involve millions of embedded devices in both commercial and 
industrial sectors [2, 3]. Solutions based on IoT technology can significantly upgrade 
the data-generation and integration capabilit ies of production systems, further pushing 
for the integration of cloud computing and big  data into manufacturing environments. 
While process and safety-critical data can thus become integrated, the underlying 
potential security and privacy vulnerabilit ies of such a process, if not appropriately 
handled, make the connected factory more susceptible to attacks [4, 5, 6]. Th is is 
particularly important as  many studies have revealed security weaknesses in embed-
ded devices [7, 8, 9]. Such  threats have profound commercial, legal, safety and social 
implications. A smart manufacturing system may comprise several cyber physical 
production systems (CPPs), which involve monitoring hardware and software  compo-
nents as integrated circuits [10]. Based on the software interactions with humans and 
CPPs and the involved different communicat ion protocols, such hardware is exposed 
to physical attacks, including invasive hardware attacks, side-channel attacks and 
reverse engineering attacks [11]. Software can be compromised by malicious code, 
such as Trojans, viruses and runtime attacks [12], while different denial-of-service 
(DoS) communication protocols can be subjected to various attacks, such as denial-
of-service attacks [13, 14]. 
Currently, security limitations of IoT devices generate new challenges for the de-
sign and implementation of embedded solutions. Typical security issues for embedded 
systems involve compromising the boot process as in the Google Nest Thermostat 
[15], hardware exp lo itation which  involves implementing parts of software /  firmware 
[16], chip explo itation with invasive intrusion to take secret information stored in the 
chip [17], cryptographic vulnerability in applications [18], backdoors in remote access 
channels able to find out credentials for administrator access [19] and traditional 
software vulnerabilit ies. These devices are intended to be part of an industrial IoT 
architecture which may become under-attack too. For example, in [20], a  successful 
attack against an industrial control system through a computer virus that infected the 
transportation network leading  to a complete stop of passenger and freight train fun c-
tion is presented. Other industrial attacks are also described in the literature [21, 22] 
and one of the most famous is the Stuxnet attack [23] which caused the failure of 
centrifuges within Iran ian nuclear facilities. It is therefore necessary to develop strat-
egies, architectures and solutions which address such challenges. Relevant work in-
cludes common standard protocols used in SCADA systems, emphasizing security  
threats and vulnerabilities [24], with standard communication protocols considered at 
three different layers: the Physical/Link layer, the Network/Transport Layer and the 
Application Layer [25]. This paper analyses relevant requirements and present s the 
design and development of a new security architecture for IoT-enabled data exchang-
es in an industrial setting. This is introduced in the next section.  
3. A modular approach for IoT security in manufacturing 
The multip le vulnerab ilities associated with the introduction of IoT technology in 
manufacturing  and especially  on legacy production machinery, require a re -thinking 
of the design approach to security. Instead of adding complexity at single security 
control mechanisms, such as in encryption or authentication for accessing a ne t-
worked  device, one approach would  be to de-compose the whole device into multip le 
components, each contributing additional security barriers. Furthermore, the very 
nature of such security barriers may be adaptive, adding further complexity needs to 
any mechanism design to attack an IoT-enabled solution. Our innovative modular 
approach to IoT security in manufacturing environments employs such concepts to 
increase the overall complexity needed for an attack to succeed, while remain ing sim-
ple to implement. To illustrate this, we present a new modular design for an IoT data 
acquisition (DAQ) unit, aimed at machine tools monitoring  
 
 
Fig. 1. The modular IoT DAQ  
Fig. 1 illustrates the modular IoT DAQ proposed for communicating at the Ma-
chine-to-Machine (M2M) level, as well as with others IoT layers. The design decom-
poses the overall device to independent modules for sensing and communicat ing, 
indicated as 1st module and 3rd module. An intermediate unit, marked as 2nd module, is 
the key to mediate between collecting and processing data from several sensors and 
sending them outside the factory. The device size is small so to allow comfortably 
fitting into a machine tool. Such IoT modules can use different communication proto-
cols to share informat ion inside and outside the factory. The sensed data can be sent 
to the cloud, managed by different services, and shared with the end-user devices or 
sent to a service provid ing vendor, tasked with monitoring in real time the status of 
the machines. One of the advantages of this architecture is the flexib ility in terms of 
easy replacement or re-use of individual components. The modularizat ion yields low 
power needs in terms of device capability, making it also possible to isolate sensing 
by accommodating a single sensor instead of several sensors per module. Further-
more, the modular IoT DAQ can work as a modem able to convert one communica-
tion protocol into another. These features allow building a robust IoT device, which 
can work areas with high electronic noise, such as around the machine spindle and 
drives. At the same time, they maintain the flexib ility of mult i-connectivity, being 
able to support different wireless protocols, each with own security provisions. The 
proposed modular IoT DAQ employs a hardware and software authorizat ion protocol 
of cascaded complexity, allowing access to the module data for authorized users [25].  
 
 
Fig. 2. Secure authentication protocol 
The proposed authentication protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2. The slave unit repre-
sents sensing and communicat ion entities (1st and 3rd modules) while the master is the 
key (2nd module). The protocol comprises four phases for enabling the sensor opera-
tion and accessing its data. The initial phase involves the physical authentication be-
tween the sensors, transceiver technologies, and the key. Each sensor and communi-
cation module is equipped with an ID number, to be recognized only  by the key mod-
ule. The next phase is an agreement about the baud rate to share signals, information 
and password. The master offers a new baud rate and the slave will accept after eva l-
uating requirements, such as frequency and time. The third phase consists of sending 
the hardware password by the master to the slave. This hardware password is a specif-
ic frequency agreed beforehand between the two parts. The last phase consists of 
recognizing the alphanumeric password sent by the slave and executes the code to 
collect sensor data. All phases are supported with AES cryptography. Adopting a 
modular IoT approach, instead of employing monolith ic IoT devices, offers the possi-
bility to personalize the choice of the device setup, to replace single modules without 
compromising the entire device and to cascade the complexity of security provisions .  
4. Case study and pilot implementation 
We present an instantiation of the proposed architecture on a problem of consider-
able interest for industry, that of introducing legacy machine tools with IoT-emabled 
monitoring capabilit ies. Most legacy machine tools do not have built-in sensors and 
do not have any local or external network communication. Interconnecting such ma-
chinery introduces security threats related not only to the machine tools but to every-
thing around them and everything that interfaces with them.  
 
 
Fig. 3. The modular IoT implementation for legacy machine tools 
Fig. 3, shows the implementation of the modular IoT DAQ with a legacy machine 
tool (DMG NTX 1000/W). A real industrial case was built around the machine to 
simulate and study possible weaknesses in implementing the IoT technology. The top 
left shows the spindle during normal operation, equipped with the sensor module (1st 
module), which is inactive until the connection with the key module (2nd module) is 
established. The key module executes code for sensing, processing and communi-
cating, as well as the code to read the CPU usage for each authentication protocol 
phase. The communication module (3rd module) consists of different ways to share 
data into the local or external network. Typically, this configuration would be suscep-
tible to the types of attacks discussed in section 2. Fig. 3 illustrates a case where RF 
component employs the Wi-Fi module (3rd module), which comes under attack, 
changing CPU from from 50% to 65%. The modular IoT will change the communica-
tion protocol into ZigBee protocol and will send data to the service company and the 
cloud or end-user devices, while the Wi-Fi operat ion shuts. All information shared 
within  this IoT architecture is encrypted and only the key  module is equipped with an 
SD card to  store the data for limited time before transferring outside. In  case of trans-
ferring malicious code to the IoT module, attempting to compromise the data, the 
authentication protocol prevents unauthorised users from accessing device files and 
codes. This case illustrates initial implantation steps of the modular secure IoT archi-
tecture for manufacturing environments , with minimal hardware costs, but significant 
data handling and CPU capacity.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper deals with integrating IoT technology with security provisions on lega-
cy production machinery  monitoring. The proposed approach adopts a modular archi-
tecture instantiated on an IoT DAQ, which employs a hybrid authentication protocol 
addressed both at the hardware as well as communication levels. The architecture was 
implemented on a DMG Mori Seiki machine tool as an example of the applicability to 
a wide ranging legacy systems, aimed at bringing them towards the Industrie 4.0 era. 
The next steps include extensive testing of the proposed solution, extension to handle 
additional security threats, as well as the migration of the components of the modular 
architecture into an industry-JUDGH GHYLFH ZKLOH DOVR H[WHQGLQJ LWV¶ RSHUDWLRQ as a 
remote control system for d ifferent actuators . This architecture can be employed with-
in a broader arch itecture for the predict ive maintenance of legacy machine tools. 
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